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Abstract
Introduction: The UK Pharmaceutical Industry is arguably one of the most important industries to consider in the
negotiations following the Brexit vote. Providing tens of thousands of jobs and billions in tax revenue and research
investment, the importance of this industry cannot be understated. At stake is the global leadership in the sector,
which produces some of the field’s most influential basic science and translation work. However, interruptions and
losses may occur at multiple levels, affecting patients, researchers, universities, companies and government.
Goals: By understanding the current state of pharmaceutical sector, the potential effect of leaving the European Union
(EU) on this successful industry can be better understood. This paper aims to address the priorities for negotiations by
collating the analyses of professionals in the field, leading companies and non-EU member states.
Research methods: A government healthcare policy advisor and Chief Science Officer (CSO) for a major pharmaceutical
firm were consulted to scope the paper. In these discussions, five key areas were identified: contribution, legislative
processes, regulatory processes, research and outcomes, commercial risk. Multiple search engines were utilised for
selecting relevant material, predominantly PubMed and Google Scholar. To supplement this information, Government
documents were located using the “GOV.UK” publications tool, and interviews and commentaries were found through
the Google News search function.
Conclusion: With thorough investigation of the literature, we propose four foundations in the advancement of
negotiations. These prioritise: negotiation of ‘associated country’ status, bilaterally favourable trade agreements,
minimal interruption to regulatory bodies and special protection for the movement of workforce in the life
sciences industry.
Keywords: Brexit, Pharma, Pharmaceutical, Industry, Impact of Brexit, Leaving EU, Drug manufacture,
Employment, Workforce, Funding
Background
A glance at the stock market suggests that the UK’s
pharmaceutical sector has emerged largely unscathed
from Brexit, performing comparatively stronger than
other industries in the immediate economic uncertainty
that followed the referendum result in June 2016. As
industries such as banking and insurance grappled with
the pound falling to its lowest level in thirty years [1],
the pharmaceuticals sector appeared to buoy calmly
above the volatility. The British pharmaceutical
company, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), headquartered in
Brentford, UK, even saw its share price rise in the imme-
diate aftermath of the vote, highlighting the robustness
of the industry [2]. These results panned out promi-
singly, flouting widespread speculation that the sector
would be one of the worst hit. Some in the industry,
whilst acknowledging the potential negative impacts of
Brexit, even hailed independence from the EU as an
opportunity for the UK to leverage its life science sector
[3]. Such short-term observations would make an
optimistic evaluation of the impact on the industry a
seemingly straightforward one to write. However, it
would likely prove short-sighted. As negotiations for a
post-Brexit world take shape, the UK’s pharmaceutical
industry, one of the country’s most reputable sectors,
has perhaps more at stake than any other industry owing
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to the complex nature of its current regulatory, funding
and research structures.
The gravity of the potential disruption to the industry is
reflected in the fact that the UK government has outlined
science and innovation as one of the 12 ‘negotiating prior-
ities’ of Brexit [4]. This is matched by the insistence of
industry leaders that a solution be reached swiftly in order
to prevent financial damage to the sector and possible
risks to all those who depend on the research, products
and services it delivers. For example, Steve Bates, BioIn-
dustry Association CEO, has called for an early agreement
on issues such as regulation of medicines and the ability
of non-UK nationals to work in the UK life science eco-
system, whilst the European Federation of Pharmaceutical
Industries and Associations has warned that “disruption
could lead to delays in medicines reaching patients” [5].
The pharmaceutical industry is being afforded atten-
tion and a sense of immediacy in these early stages of
negotiation, yet the details that will determine its future
remain unclear. This report aims to inform on the pos-
sible options available to the UK pharmaceutical sector
now that its relationship with the EU faces potentially
drastic changes. It is impossible to predict whether this
new affiliation will be one of continuing partnership,
lukewarm cohabitation or absolute divorce in terms of
the deals reached on regulation, clinical trials, and the
movement of persons and drugs (amongst other factors).
It is possible, however, to shed light on the intricacies of
any one these options, drawing knowledge from the EU’s
current relationships with non-EU states. Combining
this insight with an outlining of the current state of the
UK pharmaceutical sector should provide clearer under-
standing of where the priorities lie for pharma in these
crucial Brexit negotiations.
Methodology
The impact of Brexit on the pharmaceutical industry is a
diverse subject that is placed at the conjunction of
economics, politics and science. In order to adequately
represent the depth of discussions, the study consulted
experts for their guidance in scoping this project. Three
experts were selected for their breadth of knowledge: a
government public health consultant, a member of parlia-
ment (MP) and a Chief Science Officer (CSO) of a major
pharmaceutical firm. Following this scoping phase, five
key areas were identified for exploration:
- Contribution*
- Legislative processes
○ Consideration of post-Brexit models*
■ Swiss
■ Canadian
■ European Economic Area
○ Potential cost burden from additional regulatory
and market entrance requirements
- Regulatory processes
○ European Medicines Agency*
○ Medicines and Healthcare Regulations Agency*
○ Movement of people*
○ Professional standards
○ Clinical Trials Directive and Clinical Trials
framework*
○ The Customs Union
- Research and outcomes*
○ Horizon 2020
○ Other EU funded projects
○ Continued access to EU funding in science and
technology
- Creation of reputational and commercial risk for
pharmaceutical companies wishing to do business
from within and outside the UK
To find relevant literature, composite and extended
terms containing the roots “pharm*” and “drug*” were
searched with terms relating to Brexit, such as “Brexit”,
“EU”, “eur*” and “leave EU”, in search engines Pubmed
and Google Scholar. Additionally, the same terms were
used to locate government documents via the
“GOV.UK” publication search tool. Furthermore, reports
and commentaries were found through regulatory body
websites and pharmaceutical associations such as
“European Medicines Agency”, “Association of British
Pharmaceuticals” and “UK Biotech Association”. Articles
and interviews were discovered through the use of
internet search engines such as “Google News”. Finally,
specific numerical figures and anecdotes from notable
individuals were sought directly using the aforemen-
tioned search tools.
The research framework is outlined in Fig. 1. The initial
search found 252 documents, of which 79 were used to in-
form an extended report and 60 of those used for this
manuscript (Fig. 1). The items labelled with an asterisk (*)
were the focus of this manuscript. Limitations in available
literature excluded topics relating to: customs union,
future trade risk and new British professional standards.
Pre-Brexit figures
The pharmaceutical industry constitutes an important
component of the UK economy. The UK life sciences
sector contributed £30.4 billion in UK GDP, supported
482,000 jobs and contributed £8.6 billion in taxes in
2015 [6], a significant portion (over half ) due to the
pharmaceutical industry [7]. Two of the world’s largest
pharmaceutical companies, AstraZeneca and GSK, are
headquartered in the UK and almost all notable multi-
national pharmaceutical companies maintain a presence
in the country.
The UK’s life sciences industry is viewed as one of the
most dynamic in Europe and has received substantial
foreign investment over the last ten years [8]. Multiple
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facets to the industry have allowed the UK to become
a world leader in scientific research ahead of both
China and the US, a feat which has ultimately bene-
fitted the UK [9]. Investors appreciate the fairness
and transparency of the UK’s regulatory environment
and have benefited from a collaborative government-
industry relationship.
Industry overview
The pharmaceutical sector employs approximately
70,000 people in the UK [10] and provides jobs in a
number of areas: manufacturing, distribution, clinical
trials and R&D.
Pharmaceutical manufacturing is one of the few compo-
nents of the UK’s manufacturing sector to have experi-
enced fairly consistent growth in output, productivity and
employment over the last decade. Looking ahead, growth
rates of 4–10% per annum had been forecast for the sector
[11]. It is the most research intensive component of the
UK economy and is responsible for around 25% of all
commercial R&D conducted in the UK [12].
The UK is the main location in Europe for venture fi-
nancing of pharmaceutical companies, accounting for over
a third of the total Venture Capital (VC) raised in the
pharmaceutical sector in Europe [13]. The London Stock
Exchange, including its smaller sub-market, Alternative
Investment Market (AIM), is an important source of
funding for pharmaceutical companies, although it is not
dominant within Europe [14] (Fig. 2).
Pharmaceutical manufacturing
The UK’s reliable legal system and strong protection of
intellectual property has helped to establish the country
as a major centre for the manufacture of medical devices
and pharmaceuticals. It is estimated that there are over
500 pharmaceutical manufacturers in the UK [15].
The UK’s domestic market for pharmaceutical products
is currently valued at ~£30 billion and demand for
pharmaceutical products is expected to grow substantially
due to the pressures of an ageing population [16]. Weak
economic growth could reduce growth projections for the
sector but, in general, demand for healthcare products has
been resilient to economic downturns with the sector’s
growth remaining positive even during the 2008–09 crisis.
The EU remains the largest single export market for UK
pharmaceutical companies. Exports to the EU have grown
by around 30% over the last 10 years and further growth
is expected. Germany is a crucial market due to its large
and wealthy yet rapidly ageing population [15]. However,
the EU now represents less than half of total UK pharma-
ceutical exports. Exports to outside the EU more than
doubled over the last ten years. Key growth markets are
Asia (especially China) and the US [15].
Drug pricing and reimbursement is an exclusive
competency of EU member states. Consequently, third
parties can purchase branded pharmaceuticals in EEA
member states with lower prices and then resell them in
other EU member states [17]. This process is known as
parallel importation. Parallel imports of pharmaceutical
products were prohibited in Sweden until it joined the
Fig. 1 Research framework
Kazzazi et al. Journal of Pharmaceutical Policy and Practice  (2017) 10:32 Page 3 of 12
EU in 1995; evidence suggests that, since then, parallel
imports have reduced pharmaceutical prices [18].
Biosimilar drugs are non-branded near-equivalents of
branded biopharmaceutical products. It is possible that
the government will also seek to encourage the use of
biosimilars over the same period, although these drugs
do not offer the same cost savings as generic drugs. The
UK government has been focusing on cost reduction
measures in recent years and this has included empha-
sising the use of generic drugs. Spending on generic
drugs as a portion of total healthcare spending is
expected to rise over the next decade [19].
Clinical trials
The UK’s National Institute for Healthcare Research
(NIHR) is the largest funder of clinical trial research in the
EU [20]. Clinical trials provide important information for
academics and R&D departments. The UK’s status as a
major location for clinical trials enhances its desirability as
a location for pharmaceutical development.
Since 2004, the UK has been party to the EU Clinical
Trials Directive (CTD), 2001/20/EC EUCTD, which has
received criticism for adding red tape, whilst bringing
few tangible benefits and perhaps encouraging clinical
trials to take place outside the EU. Sir Michael Rawlins,
current chair of the Medicine and Healthcare Products
Regulatory Agency (MHRA), referred to the original
CTD as a “catastrophe” [21]. Nonetheless, with substan-
tial changes to this directive due to be implemented in
2018, there is little support amongst the research com-
munity for leaving the EU-wide clinical trials network.
One key issue is the increased emphasis on rare diseases
and genetic research. Both occur highly infrequently,
making it impossible to generate a sufficiently large sam-
ple in any particular EU country [22]. This necessitates
international longitudinal studies and it is feared that the
UK will be unable to participate in such studies once out-
side the framework of the European CTD. That said, the
UK is home to “The 100,000 Genomes Project”, a national
initiative aiming to sequence the DNA of 100,000 people.
This is the largest project of its kind in the world [23].
Effect of Brexit on the pharmaceutical industry –
Post-Brexit
Innovation
The pharmaceutical industry is one of the UK’s main
motors for innovation. Investing more in R&D than any
other sector in the UK (£4 billion in 2014 [24]), the life
sciences sector stimulates the creation of highly skilled
jobs and the formation of partnerships and collabora-
tions with academia and other sectors, which generates
value for the UK.
The UK is a reference internationally in the life
sciences industry, having discovered and developed 25 of
the top 100 prescription medicines globally [15]. Never-
theless, to sustain the status of global leadership in the
sector, it is essential to guarantee long-term funding, the
brightest talent and the ability to collaborate at scale.
Commercialisation of this research will require funding
of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), from inception
to sale, or Initial Public Offering (IPO).
The commercialisation and growth of SMEs rely heavily
on the UK’s VC, whilst also depending greatly on the
European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European In-
vestment Fund (EIF) funding; these constitute 25–40% of
VC funds and attract further private investment [25]. If
the European Investment Bank (EIB) funding pipeline is
broken, UK SMEs will suffer and fewer start-ups will be
created.
Diminished innovation
Framework Programmes (FPs) are the main EU funding
mechanism for research, development and innovation,
accounting for 78% of EU research funding received by
Fig. 2 Pharmaceutical Industry at a Glance
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the UK between 2007 and 2013 (FP7) [26] or 3% of UK’s
expenditure on R&D over the same period [27]. As a re-
sult of FPs and structural funds for research and
innovation activities, the UK secured €8.8 billion in
funding from the EU between 2007 and 2013 [28],
earning €3.4 billion more than contributed [29].
Horizon 2020 is the current FP with a budget of €74.8
billion available for the period 2014 to 2020 [29]. This
amount is distributed based on criteria of scientific ex-
cellence, alignment with a number of strategic objectives
(‘grand challenges’), geographical and disciplinary diver-
sity, and potential for commercialisation.
The HM Treasury has committed to underwrite funding
for approved Horizon 2020 projects applied for before the
UK leaves the EU [30], providing short-term reassurance
to applicants from the UK’s research and innovation base.
Access to EU funding beyond Horizon 2020 is still un-
known, which is particularly worrying in the Life Sciences
sector where projects can require extended periods of
time. However, an individual of any country maintains the
right to apply for funding from the European Research
Council and the Marie Skłodowska-Curie funding.
Loss of global research leader status
Although 19% of the world’s most cited life science
academic publications in 2012 were produced by the UK
[24], 60% of all internationally co-authored papers are
with EU partners [31]. Cross-border collaborations be-
tween EU member states are becoming increasingly
paramount in achieving the scale required to make
breakthrough discoveries. Loss of EU membership pre-
sents a considerable obstacle in maintaining the UK at
the forefront of global research. Furthermore, if non-EU
countries see European scale as indispensable to meeting
their objectives, it is likely that they will target partner-
ships outside of the UK.
Additionally, loss of alignment with the EU on data
protection could further endanger the UK’s leading
position since the current UK Data Protection Act is
insufficient to enable pan-European data sharing.
Falling R&D spending
There is a positive correlation between government
spending on medical research and private R&D spending,
a 1% increase in the former being associated with a 0.7%
increase in the latter [32]. Any reductions in public fun-
ding could result in a decline in private R&D spending
from pharmaceutical companies who, in 2014, spent 16%
of their European R&D budget in the UK [33].
The benefit of increased government expenditure on
research quality is demonstrated through Singapore’s
Agency for Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR),
which was established in 1991. This body is credited
with improving Singapore’s output to the biotechnology
sector by attracting top researchers from around the
globe. Its success is believed to be rooted in the lack of
stringent regime and control of research targets; inves-
ting in the best researchers, not just the best research
proposals, has led to an influx of researcher applications
[34]. In 2016, it committed 19 billion Singaporean
Dollars (~£11 billion) to fund R&D until 2020 [35].
Regulation
It is difficult to assess the extent to which the UK’s
pharmaceutical industry will continue to be regulated by
EU laws once the UK leaves the EU. A large part of this
depends on whether the UK will continue to be part of
the European single market and support free movement
of medicinal products, a decision for both the UK and
remaining EU member states to reach. The most likely
outcome is that companies seeking to launch new
products will have to apply separately for regulatory
approval in the UK and in the EU. This will intro-
duce delays to the system and may be detrimental to
drug launches in the UK, as companies may prioritise
applying for regulatory approval in the considerably
larger EU market. As Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs states, the “appeal of London as an environment
for the development of pharmaceuticals would be
lost” if the EMA relocates, which would in turn drive
negative impacts on R&D [36]. Not committing to
the full implementation of the European Falsified
Medicines Directive (FMD) would deprive the UK of
the EU’s efforts to prevent falsified medicines entering
EU countries and thus reaching UK patients.
Furthermore, whilst the MHRA has released a state-
ment announcing that it currently remains committed to
playing a full and active role in European regulatory pro-
cedures for medicines and devices, its position beyond
this interim period is not known. Rawlins has expressed
the MHRA’s preference for working closely with the
EMA and maintaining the current regulatory system to
the extent of even contributing to the deliberations of
the Scientific Advisory Committee. Ultimately, however,
the extent to which the MHRA will continue to engage
with the EMA will be determined by Parliament’s
Scientific Advisory Body [37]. Regardless of the UK’s
path in terms of EU market access, there will be an in-
creased authorisation burden for the UK, as drugs that
have already been centrally approved by the EMA would
need additional authorisation in the UK.
The EMA has already forecast potentially significant
disruptions to its operations following Brexit but it re-
mains unclear as to whether a relocation will take place
or what other changes will emerge in terms of the UK’s
relationship with the EMA [38].
However, these problems could be circumvented by
various administrative streamlining measures such as
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those used by EFTA states. For example, Liechtenstein
uses processes that automatically approve medicines
authorised by the EMA, whilst Norway and Iceland
remain under the EMA’s umbrella.
In April 2014, a new Clinical Trials Regulation (CTR),
Regulation EU No. 536/2014, was adopted by the EU
with the aim of full implementation by 2018 [25]. This
CTR focuses on the simplification of current rules,
streamlining applications for the conduction of clinical
trials and their authorisation, and aiming to increase the
transparency of the data produced [39]. Should the
UK not adhere to Regulation EU No. 536/2014,
innovation could be hindered as opportunities for
doctors and academics to conduct clinical trials will
be restricted and companies will begin to look else-
where to carry out theirs.
Regulation of medical devices
Medical devices are regulated by the EMA and the MHRA.
The Medical Devices Directive (MDD) similarly attempts
to apply EU-wide standards to medical devices. This means
that, at present, devices licensed in one EU country can be
sold throughout the EU. This ‘lowest common denomin-
ator’ system allows manufacturers to deliberately register
their products in countries with lower standards.
With Brexit, the MHRA is likely to impose tighter
standards on medical devices, putting in place regula-
tions that the EMA failed to install due to resistance
from member states. This will benefit larger pharma-
ceutical companies with more sophisticated R&D and
manufacturing infrastructure for ensuring products are
of a high quality. Simultaneously, these regulations may
create barriers to entry for new start-ups lacking the
capital to produce high quality products to meet the
more stringent regulations.
An end to cooperation with the EU on matters of
European pharmacovigilance (PV) and future medical
device databases (EUDAMED) will diminish the ability
of the UK to detect side effects and respond to safety is-
sues. In addition, loss of access to the European Centre
for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) could
hinder the UK’s ability to produce medicines that fight
pandemics, and may delay the manufacture and supply
of vaccines.
Loss of certainty and scale
The Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry
(ABPI) supports.
the current regulatory system, which is regarded as
highly effective, but has expressed concern about the po-
tential additional bureaucracy that a new independent
UK regulatory system would create [25].
If separate regulatory processes exist for the UK, com-
panies seeking to launch new products will have to apply
for regulatory approval in the UK and EU regions, which
would cause delays. This could be detrimental to drug
launches in the UK, as companies are likely to prioritize
applying for regulatory approval in the considerably lar-
ger (500 million) EU market; the UK only constitutes 3%
of the world’s market for new medicines (60 million). As
Rawlins stated: “One of the biggest worries I have about
Brexit and standing alone as a regulator is that we are
only 3% of the world market for new drugs and, if we
are not careful, we are going to be at the back of the
queue” [37]. David Jeffreys, spokesperson for the Associ-
ation of British Pharmaceutical Industries and Vice-
President of Eisai, a Japanese pharmaceutical firm, says,
“The early innovative medicines will be applied for in
the USA, in Japan and through the European system and
the UK will be in the second, or indeed the third, wave -
so UK patients may be getting medicines, 12, 18, 24
months later than they would if we remained in the
European system.” [40].
Conversely, some scientists take a more positive view,
arguing that Brexit provides an opportunity for more lib-
eral regulatory rules that will permit drugs to be launched
more quickly in the UK [41]. Rawlins has also suggested
the possibility of launching a system giving provisional
licenses to new medicines whilst more real-world data is
being collected, which would make the UK market more
attractive for pharmaceutical companies.
Influence
The MHRA has a wide range of international links and is
respected worldwide as one of the leading regulatory au-
thorities for medicines and medical devices. The MHRA
has shared its regulatory expertise with Malta, Latvia and
the Czech Republic in a bid to help countries that have re-
cently joined the EU to develop the systems necessary to
playing an active part in European regulation [42]. The
MHRA was:
- lead regulator in granting licensing to 7 out of 10
European medical products in 2007 [43];
- a rapporteur in 15% of the procedures of the PV Risk
Assessment Committee (PRAC) and the Committee
for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP) in
2015 [25];
- responsible for inspections that resulted in 25% of
Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) certificates is-
sued in 2015 for sites outside the EU [25].
The UK’s VMD has also played a notable role in regu-
lation, acting as a Reference Member State in 43% of
Mutual Recognition Procedures in 2015 [25]. The loss of
influence in the European system could deter regulatory
experts from living and working in the UK, and result in
the future implementation of regulations that are less
favourable to UK interests, damage that will worsen if
the EMA relocates.
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Talent
Leadership
Approximately 17% of Science, Technology, Engineering
and Mathematics (STEM) academics in UK research in-
stitutions are non-UK EU nationals [44]. Facilitating
movement across borders is essential to ensuring the
supply of talent demanded in current and emerging skill
gap areas such as bioinformatics, genomics or Advanced
Therapy Medicinal Product (ATMP) manufacturing.
The UK’s global reference status therefore depends on
removing any barriers to attracting, developing and
retaining talent. This includes the current state of uncer-
tainty regarding the UK’s future immigration policy and
the unwelcoming image projected on foreign workers.
The government remains committed to ensuring re-
searcher mobility is protected. The House of Lords con-
cluded that researcher mobility was “of critical importance
to the UK science community, including academia, busi-
ness and charities” and that “researcher mobility must be
protected if UK science and research is to remain world-
leading” [45]. A parliament report on the implications and
outcomes for science and research concluded by saying:
“We understand that the Government is not yet able to
offer firmer guarantees regarding future immigration rules
for researchers but remind them that this is essential in
order to continue to attract top-quality researchers to the
UK… There is clear agreement that researcher mobility is
a crucial component of the UK’s successful research and
science sector.” [46].
Headquarters
London is home to the EMA, as well as the European
headquarters of over a dozen global pharmaceutical
companies, the global headquarters of GSK and
AstraZeneca, and considerable R&D and manufacturing
operations for Amgen and Pfizer. This has attracted and
nurtured talent across the value chain in areas such as
research, development, regulation, manufacturing and
commerce. GSK and AstraZeneca, for example, will em-
ploy 15 and 50 university graduates respectively in 2017
[47, 48]. Outside of the EU, the UK may see its capacity
to attract talent significantly reduced, which could result
in the relocation of operations, causing losses in job,
economic contributions and innovation capacity.
Consideration of post-Brexit models
Initial overview
There are three existing models that could provide a so-
lution which would allow the UK to continue receiving
EU funding and benefitting from its association with
EU-driven scientific research actions (Fig. 3).
A further, and likely, route will be that the UK negoti-
ates its own model with the EU as it seeks to protect its
current and future research funding. It should be noted
that, even if the UK were able to adopt an existing
model, such as that of an ‘associated country’, additional
negotiations will be inevitable [49].
Associated countries
These are non-EU member states that have stipulated an
individual formal agreement on full or partial association
with an EU research funding programme. To be involved
in these programmes in the same manner as EU member
states, these countries must pay a fee which is calculated
based on their GDP and on further negotiations.
Nevertheless, whilst these countries can receive and
benefit from EU research funding, they cannot influence
the direction of these programmes as access does not
grant them a voice in the European Council or European
Parliament. This is the key difference between EU
member states and ‘associated countries’.
Since the referendum result, lobbying by Universities
UK (UUK) has sought to put pressure on the UK
government to push negotiations for ‘associated country’
status [49]. This would secure the UK’s participation in
Horizon 2020 in a similar manner to other ‘associated
countries’ [49].
Non-associated third countries
These are non-EU member states, such as Afghanistan
and Argentina, which are not formally associated with
EU research funding programmes and considered as ‘de-
veloping’ or ‘industrialised’. Nevertheless, organisations
and participants from these countries can become
partners with the programmes and receive funding.
The pharmaceutical industry
In considering the post-Brexit options for the UK
pharmaceutical industry, there are three key variations
to be discussed: EEA (specifically Norway), EFTA (spe-
cifically Switzerland) and World Trade Organisations
(WTO) (Fig. 4).
EEA
The EEA, established in January 1994, currently includes
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. These countries im-
plement EU legislation, such as free trade (except for agri-
culture and fisheries in most cases) and free movement,
acknowledge EU administrative decisions, contribute to
the EU to help level social and economic disparities across
member states, and pay custom taxes and other adminis-
trative costs. However, they cannot vote in the European
Parliament and have no says in its laws.
Norway.
The EEA model can be considered a poor deal for
Norway since it is so similar to that of EU member
states. However, Norway has retained some autonomy
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over its pharmaceutical sector. It has its own Medicines
Agency (Statens legemiddelverk), which is a subsidiary
to its national healthcare organisation. This is not so dif-
ferent to the UK where there is the NHS and the MHRA
responsible for marketing medicines.
Although being part of the EEA means that Norway
must adhere to EU regulations regarding marketing
authorisations, its own Medicines Agency can influence
the work of the EMA as EU member states can [50]. In
addition, Norway has control over its own pricing and
reimbursement, which is different for out- and in-
patients, unlike for the rest of the EU [50].
There are therefore subtle differences in how Norway
operates compared to that of EU member states, which
could make it easier to sell this as a solution to the ma-
jority who voted for Brexit. In addition, considering that
the UK’s existing framework is similar to Norway’s, it is
feasible to envisage the UK transitioning to this model.
Advantages of the EEA model for the UK [51].
The EEA model would likely be the easiest option for
the UK pharmaceutical industry, allowing for a transi-
tion to a legal framework only slightly different to the
current model, whilst incentivising pharmaceutical
companies to remain in the UK. An analysis of Norway
suggests that the EEA model can succeed in maintaining
and even attracting key players in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry; as of 2015, all major pharmaceutical companies
were present in Norway with 9 having production
facilities there [50].
Adopting an EEA model would therefore protect
the status quo, allowing for continued organisation
and efficiency between the UK and the rest of the EU
in terms of R&D, clinical trials, manufacturing, mar-
keting, distribution etc. This model would also enable
pharmaceutical companies that are only based in the
UK to benefit from the new reform starting in 2018
which will introduce a single EU portal for clinical
trials. This will ensure a harmonised process for
approval of clinical trials across the EU and enable
participating nations to access and share clinical trial
information on an EU database [52].
If the UK attains membership to the EEA, it effectively
retains its status within the EU. This incentivises those
EU pharmaceutical companies with registered offices or
manufacturing sites in the UK, as well as those that con-
duct clinical trials in the UK, to continue their activities
in much the same manner. Without this security net,
these companies will have to demonstrate that their
work complies with EU standards, which could prove
time-consuming and expensive, possibly resulting in
these companies leaving the UK.
Fig. 3 Non-EU member state funding model
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This is especially relevant to those EU pharmaceut-
ical companies that have no offices or manufacturing
plants outside of the UK. Unless the UK joins the
EEA, these companies will likely relocate to EU or
EEA countries in the pursuit of operational ease and
business security, as it will be disruptive and time-
consuming to establish new legislative practices
within a changing business environment to boot.
Joining the EEA should therefore protect the UK
pharmaceutical industry from the organisational
chaos and economic detriment of pharmaceutical
companies leaving the UK.
EFTA
The EFTA was formed in 1960 and, today, comprises
Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. It
allows for these four states to be incorporated into the
EU’s single market. The EFTA is a prerequisite for
joining the EEA.
As Switzerland is not also a member of the EEA (the
Swiss rejected the idea in 1992), it has its own bilateral
agreements with the EU, which took two years to finalise
and cover all areas from trade to transport. The com-
plexities of applying a similar model to the UK would
therefore engender momentous negotiations.
Switzerland’s model.
‘Switzerland may guard its political and cultural inde-
pendence fiercely, but its scientific sector has a strongly
international flavour’ [53].
Switzerland is a rich country and that is partly thanks
to its pharmaceutical industry, which is geared towards
high value exports and supported by expert research.
Switzerland is home to some of the world’s most
successful pharmaceutical companies, such as Novartis
and Roche, and noted for its scientific and academic
institutions.
Despite not being an EU member state, Switzerland
has also benefitted from EU FPs, such as Horizon 2020,
which offer grants for research. The UK also has a
strong reputation in the areas of science and research,
and has received proportionately high funds through
Fig. 4 Existing trade models in the EU
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these programme (£67 billion alone through Horizon
2020). In fact, the UK receives more funding from the
European Research Council than any other EU country
and has priority access to scientific facilities across
Europe, putting it at risk of losing a predicted £8.5
billion over the next four years [54].
Industry similarities and Switzerland’s economic success
outside of the EU makes it unsurprising that many leave
campaigners are championing a Swiss-inspired model as
Brexit negotiations take shape. However, it seems highly
unlikely that the EU will facilitate furthering these aspira-
tions; in 2010, it was already referring to a relationship
with Switzerland “which has become complex and un-
wieldy to manage and has clearly reached its limits” [55].
In addition, leave campaigners are motivated by what
they view as Switzerland’s privileged position in terms of
its unique relationship with the EU, yet many of them
overlook the fact that the Swiss model aligns with many
EU structures, laws and values. For example, in 1999,
Switzerland accepted free movement of persons. Re-
cently, Switzerland did indeed act to reinstate quotas on
foreign workers. However, it was effectively punished by
the EU which froze its Horizon 2020 grants and stalled
its Erasmus + student mobility scheme [56]. This is a
strong indication of the likelihood of failure if the UK
attempts to negotiate entirely on its own terms.
WTO
Debate on this subject points to a third solution for the UK
post-Brexit, that of the WTO, which is in fact the model
that the UK will automatically revert to on exiting the EU
[52]. This would be the most drastic option whereby the
UK would abandon its European premise and use the
established trade rules and norms of the WTO to forge bi-
lateral trade agreements with the EU, resulting in a model
similar to the rest of the world (that includes tariffs on trade
with the EU, customs taxes etc.) [57].
This option could potentially offer the UK flexibility
and the clean slate that leave campaigners rooted for,
but it is the most ambiguous at this stage and would
likely take many years to implement. For example, the
UK could theoretically follow Canada which, after seven
years of negotiations, signed the EU-Canada Compre-
hensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) in
2013 and now profits from 98% tariff-free trade with the
EU. Vicky Ford (Conservative MEP and Chair of the
European Parliament Committee for the Internal Market
and Consumer Protection) has stated that it is “much
more important to look at the so called ‘non-tariff
barriers’ which reflect the bureaucratic red tape faced by
companies exporting into other markets and to recog-
nise that the level of ease British companies currently
have when selling into other EU markets is much, much
greater than that which is now offered to Canada in
CETA” [58].
Final considerations
It should also be asked: is it really appropriate to compare
the UK to Norway and Switzerland when demographically
and economically these are very different nations? The
former has a population of 5.1 million, the latter’s is 8.2
million. The UK has a population of 64.7 million and a
GDP of $2.678 trillion compared to that of Norway and
Switzerland at $512.6 billion and $685.4 billion respec-
tively. The economic impact of having to be a ‘rule taker’
as opposed to a ‘rule maker’ on issues such as free move-
ment is therefore likely to be far greater for the UK than
for Norway or Switzerland [57].
There is also the historical and societal context.
Switzerland and Norway never voted to leave the EU be-
cause they were never member states in the first place;
Switzerland rejected joining the EU in 2001 with a vote
of 76.8% and Norway likewise turned down the idea on
smaller margins in referendums in 1972 and 1994.
Moving forward
In 2011, the UK economy benefited by around £30 bil-
lion from pharmaceutical and chemical exports to the
EU [59], which is just one of many figures serving to
underpin the importance of investigating the impact of
Brexit on this industry. The research conducted has
yielded several policy recommendations and priorities
based on their potential to maintain the UK’s attractive-
ness as a pharmaceutical hub post-Brexit.
Negotiate an ‘associated country’ status in the EU’s
research funding programmes
This will guarantee access to the EU FPs and enable the
UK to maintain its current dominance in the life
sciences R&D sector. It will also sustain and encourage
further collaborations between UK and European scien-
tists, alleviating concerns over the uncertainty involved
in working with UK-based partners. If the UK is to re-
main at the forefront of scientific innovation, it must
work to preserve international collaborations.
Negotiate bilaterally favourable trade agreements for drugs
and medical devices with the EU
The EU is an essential market for pharmaceutical
companies in the UK. To prevent the exodus of pharma-
ceuticals companies currently based in the UK, the
government must renegotiate trade conditions with the
EU that are comparable to those pre-Brexit. This calls
for a new streamlined customs system for UK-EU trade
with low fee and administrative burden. This will also be
important in preventing a sharp rise in the costs of
drugs imported from the EU.
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Mirroring the medicines regulatory approval process with
the EMA, whilst retaining the MHRA’s capacity to intervene
This would bypass the need for pharmaceutical companies
to seek separate product approvals in the UK. By opting
to follow the EMA’s guidance, albeit with MHRA discre-
tion for specific regulatory matters, the UK would incen-
tivise pharmaceutical companies to remain in the country
and prevent a delay in drugs reaching the UK market.
Assurance of free movement of high skilled professionals
across UK-EU boarders
This will maintain the high skill level of the workforce in
UK universities and the industry as a whole, whilst pro-
viding British nationals with the freedom to work, study
and gain experience across the EU.
This option will appeal to multinational pharmaceutical
companies who wish to quickly and easily relocate staff
across international facilities. Free movement of profes-
sionals will therefore encourage foreign pharmaceutical
companies to preserve their UK-based facilities. This will
alleviate concerns regarding their EU staff members and
their ability to attract and recruit the best in the field. Fi-
nally, such an agreement should encourage further foreign
investment in the UK.
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